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Abstract  
This paper develops a model of firm dynamics in global competition and 
experimentally analyzes multinational growth strategies and optimal coordination of 
innovative activities. It shows that growth and innovation strategies of operatively 
engaged headquarters (business or corporate) with a geocentric focus dominate 
alternative concepts, like ethnocentric, financial or flexible headquarters. The 
analysis identifies two crucial strategic advantages for successful multinational 
companies: economies of stability and global learning. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Intensive competition forces multinational enterprises (MNE) to constantly scrutinize every 
subsidiary's performance. However, for the creation of truly global competitive advantages, 
MNEs need a growth and innovation strategy that effectively utilizes and channels the interplay 
between subsidiaries, divisions, corporate headquarters, and holdings. Such a strategy must be 
flexible and open enough for local excellence without loosing too much of its global reach and 
sustainability. While previous approaches, such as the core competence framework, emphasize 
commonalities between business units, contemporary concepts in strategic management 
explicitly focus on an MNE’s center of global coordination and analyze how well its strategies 
and skills fit the needs and opportunities of various subsidiaries and divisions. Successful 
headquarters (HQ), irrespective of whether they coordinate a specific division or the whole 
corporation, do not only create more value than they cost, they also create a competitive 
advantage and more stakeholder value than any of their rivals. To accomplish this, four ways are 
identified: direct influence on each subsidiary as an entity; promotion of lateral linkages within 
the MNE; provision of functional leadership; and corporate (portfolio) development. The more 
productivity pressures force MNEs to disperse their activities throughout the world and the more 
competitive pressures impel close coordination of these operations, the more global growth 
strategies play a pivotal role in the success of the whole company. 
Empirical studies found that the coordination of research and development (R&D) portfolios and 
projects is not only highly complex and demanding, but also offers high potential returns to well 
defined global growth and innovation strategies (Campbell et al., 1995a; Buchanan & Sands, 
1994). Since the objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of such strategies it is useful to 
focus on the various mechanisms of global R&D coordination and their impact on MNE growth 
and performance in international competition. 
To achieve this objective a number of obstacles must be overcome: First, there is the need to 
survey the international management literature and develop a robust framework for the analysis 
of different growth strategies. Second, a theoretical base encompassing organizational and 
managerial aspects of multinational R&D has to be developed. Here, a behavioral innovation 
model is suggested as conceptual foundation for the analysis of MNE’s coordination of R&D. 
Since the complexity of the research problem makes it virtually impossible to obtain analytical 
solutions, a simulation model is used. Third, the dynamic dimensions of both the HQs’ growth 
strategy and corporate R&D, and their combined influence on the innovation-led growth of 
MNEs, must be considered. Although the ‘process school’ of international management 
emphasizes some of these aspects (Doz & Prahalad, 1981, 1984; Bartlett & Goshal, 1987, 1989; 
Hedlund, 1986), "despite the label of the school, the process orientation in the theoretical body 
of the school is undeveloped" (Melin, 1992, p.111). However, in a purely national setting, there 
do exist some process oriented simulation models of innovation-led firm growth (Nelson & 
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Winter 1977a/b). Therefore, in analyzing the dynamic advantages of MNEs, this paper merges 
two disparate strands of research: a solid theoretical base explaining national firm growth and the 
primarily static analysis of MNEs in global competition. 
The paper is structured as follows. In the first section two elementary dimensions of 
multinational coordination are derived from the literature, which are then employed to advance 
six coordination types for further analysis. In the second section a simulation model of MNE 
growth and R&D coordination is developed. The third section presents the simulation results and 
a discussion of their strategic significance for HQ-subsidiary interactions and multinational R&D 
coordination. The paper concludes with a short summary and some implications for theory and 
management. 
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DEVELOPING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Adopting Porter's (1986) well-known distinction between the configuration and coordination of 
international operations, it is argued that MNEs in technologically competitive markets cannot 
afford to neglect foreign location advantages (like centers of excellence) and therefore tend to 
geographically disperse their innovation process (Pearce & Singh, 1992; Cheng & Bolon, 1993). 
The following analysis assumes such a decentralized configuration and, within this framework, 
focuses entirely on the HQs’ coordination and integration of multinational R&D. 
 
Extent and Scope of Multinational R&D Coordination 
In search for a conceptual approach to multinational R&D management a review of the relevant 
literature suggests the following differentiation into HQs’ extent and scope of coordination: 
The first of these two dimensions, i.e., the extent of international coordination and control, is 
closely connected to the more traditional centralization vs. decentralization approach. This 
notion typically assumes dyadic parent-subsidiary relationships and focuses on the overall 
degree of centralization and local autonomy in decision making. The MNE is perceived to 
optimize a clearly defined trade-off between national responsiveness and international efficiency 
by seeking a balance between centrifugal forces which pull R&D decision making into 
decentralized labs and centripetal forces which tend to centralize the articulation, 
implementation and coordination of innovation programs. While a minority of firms solve this 
trade-off by choosing an extreme extent of international coordination (i.e., absolute 
centralization or total local freedom), most firms favor a joint R&D coordination with either HQ 
or subsidiary as ultimate decision maker (Behrman & Fischer, 1980a/b). Data furthermore 
indicate that many MNEs, instead of pursuing a constant policy across all subsidiaries, choose to 
inversely relate their coordinative efforts to the size and success of their labs (De Meyer & 
Mizushima, 1989; Pearce & Singh, 1992; Dunning, 1993). This case dependent variation of local 
autonomy results in a wide array of heterogeneous subsidiaries ranging from strongly controlled 
support units to world product mandates (Ronstadt, 1978; Hood & Young, 1982; Pearce, 1989). 
Turning from the traditional concept of dyadic trade-offs to a more expanded network approach 
in R&D management, a second dimension must be added to the one identified above: 
This second dimension, i.e., the scope of coordination, potentially captures the strategic value of 
operating labs in different countries by embodying the importance with which subsidiaries' local 
advantages and interests are considered in the HQs’ formulation of a global strategy. Scope of 
coordination thus represents an MNE's market orientation or its mentality along the lines of 
Perlmutter's (1969) classic ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric conceptions. The more 
recent process school extensively elaborated these conceptions. Therefore, the proposed 
dimension of scope also constitutes an important element in contemporary MNE models, like 
Bartlett & Goshal's (1987, 1989) 'transnational' and Hedlund's (1986) 'heterarchy'. All of these 
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concepts go beyond the traditional parent-subsidiary dichotomy by emphasizing lateral 
information flows and technology transfers between interdependent subsidiaries as idiosyncratic 
characteristics of integrated networks - an aspect which many empirical studies confirm to be 
crucial for a globally effective innovation process (Pearce & Papanastassiou, 1996; Pearce & 
Singh, 1992; De Meyer & Mizushima, 1989; Goshal & Bartlett, 1988). 
 
Typology of MNE’s central coordination 
Table 1 shows six different HQ types that can be derived from respective combinations of the 
two dimensions, extent and scope of international coordination. 
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Table 1 
Scope of Internatio- Extent of International Coordination 
nal Coordination ↓ high low case dependent 
home market: operative HQ 
(domestic) 
financial HQ 
(domestic) 
flexible HQ 
(domestic) 
world market: operative HQ 
(multinational) 
financial HQ 
(multinational) 
flexible HQ 
(multinational) 
 ethno- or geocentric polycentric case dependent 
 
The operative HQ, as the name implies, intensively coordinates its subsidiaries along a centrally 
articulated program. However, it is the scope or contents of this program that determines the 
specific role of the HQ. While the geocentric HQ tries to integrate the interests and local market 
characteristics of its subsidiaries into a globally balanced strategy, the rather ethnocentric HQ 
focuses on home market issues and a hands-on style of management. Although the close 
involvement of the operative HQ offers competitive advantages in synergies and economies of 
scale, it also bears the downside of biased interferences and little local responsiveness. The more 
geocentric HQ, in contrast, motivates and evaluates local managers on more flexible financial 
and strategic criteria. It thus encourages lateral relations and local initiative, but runs the risk of 
striking the wrong balance and loosing potential competitive advantages. 
The financial HQ coordinates a federation of loosely linked entities, where local managers 
(much like in diversified conglomerates) are given considerable autonomy to meet their budget 
and profit targets. Since this highly decentralized decision making overrides the HQ's scope of 
coordination, MNEs with either type of financial HQ are primarily polycentric and differ only 
marginally due to their domestic or multi-domestic orientation. 
The flexible HQ, as discussed in the previous subsection, adapts its extent of coordination and 
control to local subsidiaries' size and performance. While successful subsidiaries gain more 
(polycentric) autonomy, those with poor results loose some of their independence to the 
(ethnocentric or geocentric) parent. Due to this case dependent influence of the parent, a 
homogeneous strategic orientation within the MNE is unlikely. 
On the basis of this framework several questions can be asked: Do competitive advantages due to 
a global growth and innovation strategy exist? In a heterogeneous and dynamic world, how do 
the different HQ types perform and which provides most competitive advantages in R&D 
coordination? What sort of strategic advantages can be identified and how do they originate in 
MNEs? 
In order to answer these questions the following section develops a simulation model of MNE 
growth. This instrument is then used to experimentally analyze the different parent types in a 
dynamic setting of global competition. 
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MODELLING GLOBAL GROWTH AND INNOVATION STRATEGIES 
The following model of international firm growth allows the simulation of a maximum of L=3 
countries (indexed l), each of which is able to function as home market and location of the HQ 
for not more than U=2 MNEs (indexed u). As shown in Table 2, the entire population of firms 
consists of up to 6 MNEs (with a total of 16 subsidiaries) which compete against each other, both 
globally (as multinational entities u) and locally (as subsidiaries l,u).1 Depending on the 
configuration of worldwide operations, subsidiaries may innovate, produce and/or market local 
products, while the main function of their HQ is to coordinate these activities. The subsections 
below will present these areas of responsibility in order: 
 
Table 2. The 'global market' in the simulation model 
MNE/locat. u = 1 u = 2 u = 3 u = 4 u = 5 u = 6 
l = 1 HQ 1,1 HQ 1,2 Subs. 1,3 Subs. 1,4 Subs. 1,5 Subs. 1,6 
l = 2 Subs. 2,1 Subs. 2,2 HQ 2,3 HQ 2,4 Subs. 2,5 Subs. 2,6 
l = 3 Subs. 3,1 Subs. 3,2 Subs. 3,3 Subs. 3,4 HQ 3,5 HQ 3,6 
 
Innovation Process 
In this model, all economic activity is seen to result from an innovation process. For this an 
idealized R&D process is simulated: scientific inventions from the research phase are 
transformed into marketable technologies (indexed c) in the development phase, which finally 
serve as a basis for the construction and market introduction of single products (indexed r) 
during the design phase.2 The following primarily focuses on a subsidiary's research phase as an 
exploratory example for all 3 stages in global R&D. 
Equation [1] shows that there are 3 different sources for the locally attainable research output IF 
in period t: first, own research activities ΩF; second, spill-overs from local competitors ΓF; and 
third, research done by other subsidiaries in the same MNE. The last right-hand term assumes 
that active subsidiaries (who's pointer FLi,u define i as their research location) engage in intra-
MNE networking by exchanging their local research results ΩF with sister-laboratories in other 
countries (i≠l). However, in the international information transfer a share of κF is lost. The 
intuition behind this technology transfer parameter κF is twofold: It can be interpreted as a 
demand side parameter, which determines the extent of research in one country accepted by 
customers in another. In this case, κF serves as a measure of heterogeneity in global demand. 
Alternatively, it can be seen as a supply side parameter which captures inefficiencies in the 
communication and coordination of global R&D. 
                                                 
1 The gray areas in Table 2 mark the MNEs' home countries. 
2 Since both research and development of a technology c are conducted in a parallel fashion, inventions are not 
indexed separately. 
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As shown in equation [2], a firm's own research ΩF is typically seen as a long-term process 
which requires stamina and commitment in the form of continuous periodical investments KF.3 
Hence, the average budget over the duration of research project c in t (with the last period ψF of 
project c-1 as starting point) is calculated.4 This average is normalized over a minimal 
investment KF,min and allows for economies of scales βF. 
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In line with the growth model of Nelson & Winter (1977a/b), it is assumed that a firm's success 
does not solely depend on internal R&D, but also on technological spill-overs ΓF from its local 
competitors (see equation [3]). If a firm wants to gain such external results, first, its output ΩF 
has to be lower than the corresponding output ΩF,max of the technological leader and, second, the 
country-specific diffusion rate α has to be strictly positive to allow for information to spill-over 
at all. An industry-specific dialogue parameter ι determines, to what extent own R&D is needed 
to profit from competitors' research. In order to understand, exchange and utilize external 
information (provided ι>0), a firm must first invest in its internal technical know-how or 
'dialogue capability'. 
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3 The periodical research budget KF is determined by an exogenously given percentage of total revenues in t-1. 
4 The total research length ψFc-ψFc-1 for technology c is a decreasing and convex function of IF (see Weitzel, 1996). 
 8
At this point the research phase of the simulated innovation process is fully defined. With the 
exception of the following differences, equations [1]-[3] analogously apply to the development 
and design stage: For the determination of firm's output in the development phase, equation [2] 
does not look at an average, but an accumulation of periodical investments. Thus, in contrast to 
research, the development output increases with each period, reflecting the notion that the 
distinct nature of this stage is one of learning by trial-and-error.5 The main difference between 
(technological) research and (product) design is the relatively short and manageable time horizon 
of the latter. Here, equation [2] considers a simple time-cost trade-off, which a firm chooses for 
each new design project (see Weitzel, 1996). 
 
Production Process 
Total production costs are split into a variable part KP,var and a fixed part KP,fix. In equation [4], 
the latter is primarily a function of fixed unit costs kP,fix and local production volume V in t-1.6 
Fixed costs are investment decisions made in the past. So, for simplicity, the production volume 
V in t-1 is used to calculate the fixed costs in t. The final right-hand term in [4] represents 
experience effects which are positively influenced by the cumulative amount of produced goods 
and a learning rate λ. (The total variable costs KP,var are determined analogously to [4] with the 
distinction that they are linked to the current volume V in t.) 
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Diffusion Process 
A firm's total sales are calculated on the basis of the Bass diffusion model (1969). Due to its 
widespread recognition, the following only briefly discusses how the concept is utilized in this 
paper, i.e., how a selection of firm-specific parameters labeled 'marketing package' influences the 
purchase behavior of consumers. Since potential demand M is divided into φM venturesome 
'innovators' and (1-φ)M risk averse 'imitators', each product of each firm has 2 corresponding 
marketing packages.7 For innovators, who are disposed to trying a new product (mainly because 
of its novelty), the most important influence to buy is the extent of R&D incorporated in the 
innovation.8 Low prices certainly have a positive effect, but their weight in the marketing 
                                                 
5 In other words: The longer and the more intensively a development team tests and improves a new technology the 
safer, easier to handle and more comfortable it eventually is for the customer. 
6 Note that the production volume V is not restricted to local sales only. Depending on the global configuration of 
production capacity, it can also be the volume of a world scale plant. 
7 To avoid the so-called 'Bass trap' the market is split a priori (see Weitzel, 1996). 
8 In the marketing package the extent of R&D is represented by output I (see equation [1]). 
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package is comparatively small.9 However, for imitators, who buy in later stages of the product 
life cycle, the opposite weighting is assumed. Furthermore, since imitators typically purchase 
tried products, the most important factor in their marketing package is the number of previous 
sales of the product as a proxy for perceived quality and word-of-mouth. Once all marketing 
packages are fully described by the elements above, the impact of competition is taken into 
account by determining, for each market segment, the relation of a firm's product-specific 
marketing package to all corresponding values in the industry. 
 
Coordination Process 
Up to this point the model provides little indication, whether the local innovation, production 
and diffusion processes discussed above should be interpreted as isolated activities in 
autonomous subsidiaries or as integrated activities in a tightly coordinated network. In the latter 
it is the responsibility of the HQ to develop and implement a global growth strategy. Since R&D 
is a major source of corporate growth, the model focuses on the renewal and expansion of 
product ranges when formulating local and global growth strategies. According to the satisficing 
principle (Cyert & March, 1963) and as shown in condition [5], it is assumed that a firm plans to 
introduce a new product, as soon as its actual growth rate W falls below a certain aspiration 
level, or critical growth rate Λ.10 Given this impetus to innovate, the urgency of the new project 
(i.e., the length of its design phase τ) is determined in equation [6], where ϑ∈[0,1] represents an 
MNE's inertia to change. In [5] and [6], WH, ΛH and ϑH represent the global values of the HQ 
whereas WS, ΛS and ϑS stand for the local growth and strategy values of the subsidiary. Their 
relative influence in an MNE's coordination process is determined by the centralization 
parameter z∈[0,1]. If z=0, subsidiaries act totally autonomous, if z=1, the whole MNE is 
centrally managed by the HQ, and if 0<z<1, growth strategies are more or less joint decisions. 
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[6]  ( )τ ϑ ϑl u c r u uH u tH u l uS l u tSz zW W, , , , , , ,= ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + 1-
 
While z defines the extent of central coordination, a second strategic parameter ∆ specifies the 
scope of central coordination, i.e., the proportion with which subsidiaries' local strategies and 
foreign market conditions are integrated into an MNE-wide growth strategy. As shown in 
equation [7], the integration parameter ∆ determines to what extent the HQ (located in the 
 
9 Prices are endogeneously determined (with a mark-up on unit costs) and account for experience effects. For a 
more detailed disussion see Weitzel (1996). 
10 Both growth rates, W and Λ, refer to the (actual or targeted) quotient of firms' revenues in t-1 and t. 
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MNE's home country, where pointer HQl,u equals l) considers the local growth W
S of its 
subsidiaries abroad (HQl,u≠l) when calculating WH for its global strategy. For simplicity, it is 
assumed that the critical growth rate ΛH and degree of inertia ϑH are calculated analogously. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
An advantage of simulation models is that they are able to analyze complex situations. A 
disadvantage is that no analytical optimum can be achieved. However, if the complexity of a 
problem excludes analytical solutions, rather than change the assumptions and analyze the wrong 
model, an accumulation of simulation runs and a numerically approximated optimum is 
preferred. In light of this, a large number of simulation runs (collectively over two million) were 
conducted to obtain results as exact as possible.11 
In order to examine the HQ types developed from the literature (see Table 1) the maximum 
configuration of six MNEs in three countries (see Table 2) and the parameter specifications 
displayed in Appendix A are used. The operative HQ as well as the financial HQ are described 
by combinations of exogenously given high and low values for the centralization parameter z 
(extent of coordination) and integration parameter ∆ (scope of coordination). In MNEs with a 
flexible HQ, the degree of a subsidiary's autonomy is endogenously determined by the ratio of its 
local revenues (used as a proxy for the subsidiary's size and success) to the global revenues of 
the whole MNE.12 Apart from these differences in the coordination of international innovation 
processes, all six MNEs are endowed with identical parameter settings (see Appendix A). This 
ensures that the HQ's management style is the only possible origin of local or global competitive 
advantages. With regard to international demand, variations of the technology transfer parameter 
κ and the share of innovative buyers φ are used to simulate several world markets, each with a 
different degree of heterogeneity in local product preferences and a distinct risk attitude towards 
innovations.13 Such diversity in global demand not only guarantees a comprehensive analytical 
spectrum, but also generates sufficient 'management pressure' upon the HQ to prove their 
coordination skills. 
                                                 
11 Since it is impossible to show all experimental data in this paper, the following displays a selection of the most 
representative results. A copy of the program (written in Borland Turbo C++) is available from the author. 
12 The extent of coordination or centralization parameter z is therefore determined by 1-RS/RP, where RS represents 
the subsidiary's and RP the MNE's revenues. 
13 Since κ and φ are both varied in ten steps (between 0 and 1), 100 different parameter combinations or world 
markets are simulated altogether. 
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MNE Performance 
Since we analyze the growth and innovation strategies in a globally competitive environment, 
the most interesting aspect in the simulations is not the absolute performance of a single firm, 
but rather the relative success of MNEs when compared to the performance of their global 
competitors. The present analysis therefore ranks the cumulated revenues of all MNEs in each 
simulation run and then examines the frequency with which each of the six different MNEs reach 
a certain position or rank in the market.14 While all the basic results can be seen in Appendix B, 
the following attempts to first explain them along the lines of the two dimensions of coordination 
before it moves on to a more detailed discussion. 
 
Scope of International Coordination 
As far as the scope of coordination is concerned, Figure 1 shows that the market orientations of 
the HQs do have a substantial impact on the relative performance of MNEs. It also shows that 
HQs with a geocentric approach are generally more successful than their ethnocentric 
counterparts - not only in terms of market leadership (rank #1), but also with respect to their 
mean position relative to their competitors (see legend of Figure 1). Apart from these anticipated 
findings, the most striking results are the markedly different 'slopes' of the frequency 
distributions. 
As for ethnocentric MNEs, the convex shape of their distribution clearly reveals the HQs' strong 
focus on domestic issues. From an extreme perspective, the intensive coordination along a 
distinctly articulated growth strategy provokes an 'all-or-nothing' outcome: Depending on the 
heterogeneity and risk attitude of global demand, the high specialization on international 
synergies either creates a significant competitive advantage, or it simply inhibits local as well as 
global flexibility and destroys potential value added. In the first case, the fit between the HQ and 
its subsidiaries frequently leads to market leadership (see Figure 1). In the second case, the lack 
of fit does not only result in the MNE falling well behind its geocentric competitors (rank #5 or 
#6), but also causes a remarkably high number of bankruptcies (see Appendix B). 
 
                                                 
14 The same was done with respect to MNEs' cumulated profits. However, the corresponding rankings were so 
similar to those derived from the global revenues that it seems appropriate to restrict the results as described above. 
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Figure 1. Global Performance by Scope of Coordination15 
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Although this result is consistent with Campbell's et al. (1995b) theoretical and empirical 
findings about HQs' double-edged influence on subsidiaries, Figure 1 shows that it is only valid 
for certain HQ types and therefore needs to be qualified. In fact, the concave frequency 
distribution of the more geocentric MNEs tells a completely different story: In contrast to the 
'all-or-nothing' approach, which mainly relies on dyadic hub-and-spoke relations between the 
ethnocentric HQ and its subsidiaries, the geocentric scope of coordination encourages lateral 
linkages and network interaction. By doing this, it introduces an additional management goal 
that could be described as 'finding a global middle ground'. This includes the development of a 
global innovation strategy that tries to balance subsidiaries' local concerns - specifically, their 
plans for the expansion and renewal of national product ranges. The dominance of geocentric 
HQs in Figure 1 can thus be attributed to comparative advantages of network flexibility. 
 
Extent of International Coordination 
Turning from the scope to the extent of coordination, the simulation results in Figure 2 show that 
the geocentric orientation represents a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the global 
success of MNEs. Especially the high frequency of market leadership for the operative HQ 
makes it clear that superior MNE growth also depends on the HQ's ability to decisively 
implement a centrally articulated innovation program throughout the corporation.16 If the latter 
                                                 
15 This figure compares the rank-specific aggregates of all shaded columns in Appendix B (world market 
orientation) with those of the non-shaded columns (home market orientation). 
16 This theoretical finding about the dominance of operative HQs (high extent of coordination) is strongly supported 
by several empirical studies, which inter alia show that R&D is one of the most centralized functions in MNEs and 
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dimension of coordination is of little concern to the HQ, as in the case of the financial HQ, the 
chances of reaching the top rank in the competitive field are more than halved (see Figure 2). 
This is mainly due to the insufficient team-work by the subsidiaries and a subsequent lack of 
synergies in the international innovation process. However, in exchange, the high local 
responsiveness of the decentralized units prevents a greater number of bankruptcies (see 
Appendix B). While flexibility alone is not sufficient for strong market leadership, it does 
contain enough growth potential for second and third best positions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
that there is a general tendency in MNEs towards more centralized decision making (for an overview see Martinez 
& Jarillo (1989) and Dunning (1993)). 
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Figure 2. Global Performance by Extent of Coordination17 
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The most interesting result in Figure 2 is the remarkably poor performance of MNEs with a 
flexible HQ. It is highly counter-intuitive, as this type of HQ explicitly rewards successful 
subsidiaries by granting them more autonomy, and, because it pushes less successful subsidiaries 
by intensifying the pressure from central management. Nevertheless, the drawback of this 'carrot 
and stick' approach lies in the unstable and myopic coordination of local product ranges: While 
successful subsidiaries are increasingly allowed to focus on their own R&D and thereby detach 
themselves from international innovation projects, the less successful, centrally coordinated rest 
of the MNE is left behind with little mutual support. Further, the worse the collective 
performance of this group, the less potential synergy effects there are in international R&D, and 
the less local flexibility is left for the subsidiaries to at least partially offset their low product 
quality. Once such a polarity between successful and unsuccessful subsidiaries has developed 
within the MNE, even the more autonomous subsidiaries experience difficulties in global 
competition, given that they basically operate as locally isolated firms. Hence, they often end up 
in the same vicious cycle of centrally reinforced decline. This long-term argument specifically 
explains why the flexible HQ has the highest bankruptcy rate of all HQ types (see Appendix B). 
Concluding this subsection, a combined analysis of the figures above and the results in Appendix 
B show that, in a heterogeneous and dynamic world, the geocentric operative HQ dominates all 
other HQ types - not only along the two dimensions of coordination but also in terms of its 
individual market leadership. Furthermore, both the ethnocentric operative HQ and the 
                                                 
17 This figure compares the rank-specific aggregates of the first pair of columns in Appendix B (operative HQ) with 
those of the second (financial HQ) and third pair (flexible HQ). 
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multinational financial HQ are found to be considerably stronger and more competitive than 
either of the flexible HQs (see Appendix B). 
As all simulated MNEs differ only in their type of HQ, the diversity in their growth patterns 
provides evidence of the existence and importance of strategic advantages. However, despite this 
finding, it remains unclear which specific aspects of the model lead to superior performance. The 
following subsection examines this issue. 
 
Identification and Characterization of Strategic Advantages 
A closer look at the reasons for the dominance of the geocentric operative HQ reveals two 
central advantages. Both of them are based on dynamic arguments: 
 
Strategic Advantage #1: Economies of Stability 
The first strategic advantage hinges on the existence of economies of stability in MNE growth. 
In order to gain these economies, two conditions must be met: MNE growth has to be stable not 
only over time but also across geographical markets. While stability over time focuses on the 
smooth local growth of individual subsidiaries, geographical stability emphasizes a globally 
balanced growth path for the entire MNE. 
One advantage of stability over time is that subsidiaries with few fluctuations in local growth 
build up higher financial reserves and thus face a lower risk of bankruptcy. Conversely, as 
equation [4] shows, unstable growth results in frequent production overheads. Another even 
more important advantage of stability over time lies in avoiding a disproportional investment in 
new technologies and products. As discussed in connection with equation [2], one of the most 
discriminatory features of the innovation process is the time horizon of individual R&D stages. 
Since unstable growth and local crises induce subsidiaries to specialize on short-term 
instruments of success, like the design and introduction of incremental innovations, they tend to 
neglect long-term commitment in research. Thus, persistent growth fluctuations are found to lead 
to an investment gap that causes significant disadvantages with respect to future core 
competencies. 
As for the flexible HQ, a globally unbalanced growth strategy may cause a polarization between 
subsidiaries and thereby impair corporate competitiveness and performance. However, 
diminishing synergies within the MNE are not the only reason for the importance of 
geographical stability. Next to this internal motive there is also a strong external argument for an 
internationally stable growth path. According to equation [3], subsidiaries with limited or 
irregular R&D are less able to receive or utilize local technological spillovers, because they have 
a poor capacity to understand external information or, in case of joint ventures, little of their own 
information to return. It does not help to establish only sporadically active windows or 
observation posts in other countries. In order to ensure a continuous dialogue capability and to 
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obtain external R&D results, "one must be a player, not a spectator" (Bartlett & Goshal, 1986, 
p.91). To be part of technological developments around the world, MNEs must commit to 
continually invest into a network of foreign R&D labs. The more geographical stability in terms 
of internationally balanced growth, the more such a global innovation strategy is supported. 
Figure 3 illustrates the general importance of an effective R&D network by simulating the 
extreme case of a two-country / two-firm setting, where one MNE centralizes its R&D in the 
home market while the other invests into a decentralized configuration.18 With the variation of 
economies of scale in R&D (represented by β) and market heterogeneity (technology transfer 
parameter κ), two classic factors of configuration are used to establish a framework for the 
following analysis.19 As the base case on the left of Figure 3 shows, cumulated revenues of the 
decentralized MNE are higher than those of its centralized competitor whenever market 
heterogeneity is high and economies of scale are low.20 In a second simulation run, the global 
diffusion rate α is increased from 5% in the base case to 10%. As the enlarged white area on the 
right of Figure 3 shows, a higher degree of technological spill-overs forms a strong incentive for 
more decentralized R&D. In an additional simulation, the introduction of a third country with a 
local center of excellence curtails the central MNE's range of superior performance by the light 
gray area.21 This significant reduction of the dark gray area (over all simulations) supports the 
above argument for the construction and maintenance of an international R&D network. As well 
as providing support for economies of scale and market heterogeneity, the results reveal the 
importance of other exogenous factors, like technological spill-overs and foreign know-how 
agglomerations. 
 
                                                 
18 Apart from these changes to the previous simulation, all parameter values remain the same (see Appendix A). 
19 See equations [2] and [1], respectively. For empirical evidence on the importance of these two determinants in 
R&D configuration see Pearce & Singh (1992).  
20 White areas in Figure 3 represent a ratio of centralized to decentralized cumulated revenues smaller than 1. Gray 
areas represent a ratio greater than 1. 
21 For the simulation of a foreign center of excellence a purely national firm with a ceteris paribus doubled R&D 
intensity was specified. 
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Figure 3. Optimal Multinational Configuration of R&D 
 
After the analysis of the advantages of local stability over time and global stability across 
geographical markets, these two positive effects can be used to explain the different 
performances of MNEs growth and innovation strategies. As for the financial HQ, the high 
autonomy of its subsidiaries ensures a stable local growth, but at the same time impedes the 
coordination of a globally balanced development. Conversely, the ethnocentric HQ emphasizes a 
centrally stabilized MNE growth, but tends to neglect its subsidiaries' concerns and thus causes 
local crises and fluctuations. Only the global growth policy of the geocentric operative HQ 
combines both components into economies of stability. It thereby successfully creates a strong 
strategic advantage over all other coordination types. 
 
Strategic Advantage #2: Global Learning 
The second strategic advantage is based on the ability of the whole MNE to learn from the local 
successes of individual subsidiaries. To accomplish this, an HQ must ensure that national 
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advantages are perceived, communicated and appropriated throughout the corporation. Learning 
is therefore understood as geographical learning, where local success factors of demand and 
supply are integrated into a global growth strategy, which then is implemented in all 
subsidiaries.22 
For demand side factors, such as consumers' attitude towards risk, the argument runs as follows: 
Subsidiaries react to high risk levels in local markets (increased share of innovative buyers φ) by 
accelerating their R&D and expanding their product range. As Figure 4 illustrates, this has a 
positive effect on their innovation rate and growth. If the HQ's coordinative efforts support a 
global learning process, the increased innovation rate is transferred to subsidiaries in less 
challenging markets. 
 
Figure 4. Local Growth by Share of Innovators 
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For supply side factors, such as firms' aspiration levels, a similar argument can be made: 
Subsidiaries often try to compensate for disadvantages in foreign countries by pursuing a more 
aggressive innovation strategy (higher critical growth rate Λ) than their local competitors. As 
depicted in Figure 5, such focus on the frequent introduction of new products generally results in 
stronger growth. Additionally, the continuity of innovations tends to stabilize the subsidiary's 
development, as demonstrated by a comparison with the highly fluctuating and crises induced 
growth path of the lowest aspiration level (Λ=0.8). Again, with global learning, it is generally 
                                                 
22 For the first aspect of integration see equation [7], for the second aspect of implementation see [5] and [6]. 
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possible to transfer these innovation incentives to less sensitive subsidiaries and thereby enhance 
MNE performance. 
 
Figure 5. Local Growth by Aspiration Levels / Ciritical Growth Rates 
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Altogether, the general predominance of the geocentric operative HQ hinges on the fact that it 
simultaneously satisfies both conditions for global learning: the integration and implementation 
of local advantages. While the financial HQ fails to properly enact its central strategy and 
therefore violates the second condition, the ethnocentric operative HQ does not meet the first 
condition, because it is too involved with domestic issues. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The study of a HQs’ growth and innovation strategy and its role in global R&D is crucial to 
international management, for it is literally at the center of an MNE’s competitive advantages. 
Unfortunately, previous international business research provides little insight into the impact of 
dynamic and organizational factors on such strategic advantages in global innovation. 
This paper has developed a dynamic model that can assist MNE top managers in evaluating and 
reconsidering the growth strategies, coordination mechanisms, and parent-subsidiary 
relationships in their firms. Specifically, it has proposed a robust typology of HQs' approaches to 
innovation strategy and multinational R&D management. 
A numerical analysis of this typology leads to four major results: First, in constantly changing 
global markets, geocentric operative HQs have the most strategic advantages and dominate 
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alternative concepts like ethnocentric HQs and financial HQs. Second, HQs that grant successful 
subsidiaries a higher local autonomy run the risk of destroying potential strategic advantages, 
because of polarized MNE structures. Third, economies of stability in MNE growth represent a 
crucial strategic advantage, as they support the construction and maintenance of global 
innovation networks. Fourth, global learning, another strategic advantage in the coordination of 
international innovation processes and MNE growth, ensures that local advantages are perceived, 
communicated and appropriated throughout the whole company. 
With respect to the development of a potential all embracing theory of the MNE, this paper 
qualifies the dominating explanation of foreign investments, the 'eclectic paradigm' (Dunning, 
1980, 1988). The eclectic paradigm argues that three distinct sets of advantages explain 
internationalization: ownership-specific advantages, internalization advantages, and localization 
advantages. The elements of strategic coordination developed in this paper are easily linked to 
these sets of advantages. While HQs' central coordination and integration of subsidiaries can be 
interpreted as internalization advantages, subsidiaries' innovation incentives (arising from local 
demand factors) can be related to localization advantages. Furthermore, subsidiaries' innovation 
strategies may represent local ownership-specific advantages.23 Provided these three sets of 
advantages constitute an international configuration of R&D, the experimental results of this 
analysis show that only an optimal relation between localization, internalization and ownership-
specific factors ensures competitive advantages in an MNE’s global growth and innovation 
strategy. Specifically, global learning and economies of stability are identified as important 
strategic advantages. 
A second, more general implication of this analysis is that inter-firm transactions and growing 
interdependencies in global competition highlight the increasing importance of fine-tuned 
growth and innovation strategies for MNEs. This finding strongly supports the above approach 
and implications to global strategic management which also is in line with a recent reappraisal of 
the eclectic paradigm by Dunning (1995). 
                                                 
23 Critics of the eclectic paradigm claim that ownership-specific advantages should not be considered separately, for 
they stem from either localization or internalization advantages (Itaki, 1991). Of course, it is also possible to adapt 
the elements of the model to this line of argument. 
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APPENDIX A 
Parameter Specifications for Simulation 
Scope of Internatio- Extent of International Coordination† 
nal Coordination ↓ z = 0.75 z = 0.25 z = 1-RS/RP 
home market: 
∆ = 0 
operative HQ 
(ethnocentric) 
financial HQ 
(domestic) 
flexible HQ 
(domestic) 
world market: 
∆ = 1 
operative HQ 
(geocentric) 
financial HQ 
(multinational) 
flexible HQ 
(multinational) 
† RS represents subsidiary's periodical revenues and RP the whole MNE's periodical revenues. 
 
no. of periods per simulation  200 
no. of MNEs U   6 
no. of countries L   3 
market size M    20 
share of innovators φ   0.2 (or varied) 
technology transfer parameters κ 0.3 (or varied) 
economies of scale β   1.0 (or varied) 
diffusion rate α   0.05 (or 0.1) 
dialogue parameter ι   0.5 
learning rate λ   0.04 
unit fixed costs kP,fix   0.43 
critical growth rate ΛS  1.15 (or varied) 
inertia ϑ    2.0 
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APPENDIX B 
Basic Simulation Results 
Type → operative HQ financial HQ flexible HQ Total† 
Rank ↓ geocentr. ethnocentr multinat. domestic multinat. domestic  
# 1 1207 1170 673 342 547 570 4509 
# 2 727 590 1321 770 571 512 4491 
# 3 745 508 1185 967 616 488 4509 
# 4 737 538 712 1166 775 563 4491 
# 5 611 857 400 795 919 928 4510 
# 6 473 837 209 460 1072 1439 4490 
Bankrupt 904 1276 608 892 1182 1526 6388 
Total‡ 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500 4500  
 
† If two MNEs reach the same amount of cumulated revenues they both are denoted the same rank (e.g. #4) while 
the following rank (#5) is omitted. However, the MNE with the lowest cumulated revenues is still ranked last (#6). 
As the results show, this system can lead to slight differences in the total number of ranks denoted to all MNEs. 
 
‡ The total number of 4500 simulation runs is put together as follows: 100 combinations of two demand parameters 
(with a 10 step variation each) multiplied by 45 'world market combinations' of MNE home countries and possible 
configurations of local competitors. 
Proof for the existence of 45 world market combinations: For homogeneous world market combinations (all 
countries are identical ) it can be shown that there exist A3hom=15 different configurations for 6 MNEs (with 2 HQs 
in each of the L=3 countries), because of: 
( )A 2 jhomN
j 1
N= −
=
∏ 1
.
 [proof by complete induction.] 
Heterogeneous world market combinations can be described by 2N-k, k=1,...,2N-1 homogeneous combinations of 
the order N-1: 
( ) ( )A k A N 2 N 1 2 j 1 N AhetN
k 1
2 N 1
hom
N 1
j 1
N 1
hom
N= ⋅ = ⋅ − ⋅ − = ⋅
=
− −
=
−∑ ∏  
Hence, with 3 different national markets, which all represent home countries for exactly 2 MNEs, altogether 45 
world market combinations have to be considered (A3het=45). 
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